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bstract
The main objective of this study is to quantify the impact caused by changes in federal tax on the tax policy of the Brazilian
tates, considering the presence of horizontal tax competition between states. Using panel data covering 26 Brazilian states plus
he Federal District during the period 1995–2009, two models were estimated representing the average reaction of the states in
esponse to changes in federal tax rates. In the first model, both levels of government act simultaneously, whereas in the second
odel, reaction is sequential, with the federal government acting as the leader in defining its effective tax rates. The results indicate
 positive and significant response of states to increases in the federal tax rate, resulting in an over-taxation of the common tax base
nd higher tax rates. Additional tests show that the first model is the most suitable to represent the problem analysed.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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esumo
Objetivo principal desse trabalho é quantificar qual o impacto provocado por mudanc¸as no imposto federal sobre a política
ributária dos estados, considerando a presenc¸a de competic¸ão tributária horizontal entre os estados. Utilizando um painel de dados
ue abrange os 26 estados brasileiros mais o Distrito Federal no período 1995–2009, foram estimados dois modelos que representam
 reac¸ão média dos estados em resposta a mudanc¸as nas alíquotas do governo federal. No primeiro modelo ambos os níveis de
overno agem simultaneamente, enquanto que no segundo a reac¸ão é sequencial com o governo federal atuando como líder na
efinic¸ão de suas alíquotas efetivas. Os resultados apontam para uma resposta positiva e significante dos estados à aumentos na
líquota tributária federal resultando em uma sobretaxac¸ão da base tributária comum e alíquotas elevadas. Testes adicionais mostram
ue o primeiro modelo é o mais indicado para representar o problema analisado.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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1.  Introduction
A federal system is characterised by the existence of interdependent levels of government acting in the same
federation with a decentralised governance structure. Adopting a system based on fiscal federalism implies distributing
constitutional powers of taxation according to the levels of government, where each level is autonomously responsible
for the procedures of contribution and budget management, fiscal transfers, composition and dimensioning of expenses
to allow a Pareto efficient situation among the levels of government. Therefore, a country that is politically organised
according to the patterns of fiscal federalism shares, among the levels of government, the responsibility for managing
allocative, distributive and stabilising functions.
However, it is not always possible to find a situation where the levels of government in the federation act efficiently
in a Pareto sense. In federal systems, where the various levels operate simultaneously in the same tax regime and set
tax rates on the same bases, there may be the existence of externalities. In this context, one might see a phenomenon
known as tax competition. Keen (2008) defines tax competition as a strategy of fiscal adjustment in a non-cooperative
game among government levels, where each level adjusts the parameters of its tax system taking into account the tax
policy movements of other governments.
The phenomenon of tax competition arises when the decisions of fiscal and tax policy taken by a level of govern-
ment affect the tax revenues of other governments in the federation (Mintz and Tulkens, 1986; Goodspeed, 1998).
Thus, each government entity has the ability to modify the size of its tax base when adjusting its tax rates at the
expense (or benefit) of its neighbours (Mintz and Tulkens, 1986). In this context, fiscal interactions can lead to
two types of externalities: one horizontal and one vertical. In the first case, the externality occurs when govern-
ments at the same level in the federation compete for mobile revenue sources (e.g., capital, labour, firms), setting
their tax rates to attract them into their territories. In the second case, the externality arises when different levels
of government (e.g., state and federal governments) are taxing the same economic base. This co-occupancy may be
explicit or implicit when tax bases are somehow inter-related in some economic sense. The vertical interaction can
result in overtaxing, creating a situation in which the tax rates are higher than those that would prevail in the social
optimum (Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002). In both cases, the decisions regarding the adjustment of tax rates in one
level of government end up affecting the tax revenues of the other level of government, whether they are distinct or
not.
The theoretical model proposed by Flowers (1988) and its developments made by Boadway and Keen (1996),
Boadway et al. (1998), Keen (1998), Flochel and Madies (2002) and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2003, 2004)
show two important aspects of vertical interaction: interdependence among different government levels and the
equilibrium levels of taxation. The theoretical analysis of interdependence explores how the lowest government
levels react to a change in the tax rate of the highest level of government.1 The theoretical prediction for this
analysis is generally ambiguous in the sense that there may be positive or negative reactions from the lower
levels of government in response to increases in the tax rates of the highest level. An increase in taxes at
one government level results in a revenue reduction for another government level, due to contraction in the
shared tax base. In the equilibrium, the result is usually an over-taxation of the common base at higher tax
rates.
The focus of this work is the vertical tax competition between states and the federal government in Brazil. Once
tax competition between levels of government may distort the levels of taxation, the main purpose of this work is
to estimate the reaction functions that quantify the average effects of states’ tax policy in defining their effective tax
rate of ICMS, in response to increases in the effective tax rates of IPI, because they both focus on the same tax base
(consumption, in general). In other words, this work aims to determine empirically whether, on average, there exists a
significant strategic interaction – from a statistical point of view – between states and the federal government in setting
their tax rates. The analysis of these results provides empirical evidence to determine whether, in the Brazilian tax
system, the states and the federal government are overcharging the same tax base.
Empirical studies on vertical tax competition have been focusing on the estimation of a reaction function that shows
how subnational governments respond to tax policy choices from the federal government. The works of Besley and
1 The works of Boadway and Keen (1996), Keen (1998) and Besley and Rosen (1998) provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of
interdependence in tax policies among different levels of government that share a common tax base.
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osen (1998) and Goodspeed (2000) were the first to analyse vertical tax competition using this strategy. However, both
tudies do not take into account the existence of horizontal tax competition among subnational levels of government.
ubsequently, the works proposed by Hayashi and Boadway (2001), Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001), Brulhart
nd Jametti (2006), Devereux et al. (2007), Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) and Fredriksson and Mamun (2008)
ntroduced tax interaction among subnational levels of government (horizontal tax competition) in this type of analysis.
ased on research carried out by Devereux et al. (2007) and Fredriksson and Mamun (2008), Politi and Mattos
2012) analyse the vertical and horizontal externalities in cigarette and gasoline taxation in Brazil, using a database
overing the 26 Brazilian states (the capital Distrito Federal was excluded from the analysis) between the years 1995
nd 2007. As state tax rates, the authors used the ICMS tax rate for cigarettes and gasoline; as federal tax rates,
he IPI for cigarettes and CIDE for fuel were used. The federal tax rates vary only over time, remaining constant
or each state in the analysis. The results point to empirical evidence of vertical tax competition in the cigarette
ase.
In the specification of the reaction function, two assumptions regarding the strategic behaviour of government
evels were considered in our work, resulting in the estimation of two empirical models. The first model considers the
ssumption that states and the federal government adjust their tax rates simultaneously, as in a Cournot–Nash strategic
ame. The second model assumes that the federal government behaves as a Stackelberg leader within the federation,
efining its taxes in the first stage. In the second stage, the states, after observing the movements of federal tax policy,
djust their tax rates simultaneously with the other competing states in the federation.
This study is innovative in relation to previous work in at least three aspects. The first is the use of time dummies
n the econometric model to capture possible common shocks in tax policies of both levels of government. This
trategy is only possible because the data used to measure the effective federal tax rate vary on two dimensions of the
anel data: cross-section and time. The second aspect is the use of a specific test to define the assumption about the
ederal government’s behaviour in the game of fiscal adjustment with the states (i.e., Cournot–Nash or Stackelberg). To
onclude, this study employs a method of two-stage generalised fixed effects estimation, which considers the possibility
f endogeneity of the regressors, as well as the presence of heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation in the
rror terms of the panel.
This paper is divided as follows. Section 2 includes a brief analysis of indirect taxation and the Brazilian tax
ystem and, subsequently, an overall analysis of the theoretical models’ structures that considers the existence of
xternalities in the context of tax competition. Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology for analysing vertical
ax competition and the database used. Section 4 includes the results of the estimated reaction functions and the
conometric tests conducted to guide the choice of assumptions about the behaviour of strategic levels of government.
he final section summarises the main conclusions from the results presented by the econometric tests performed, as
ell as their possible implications related to the economic theory.
.  Theoretical  aspects
.1.  Indirect  taxation  and  the  Brazilian  tax  system
The Federative Republic of Brazil is politically and administratively organised into three distinct levels of govern-
ent: the federal government, states and municipalities. Each government level has internal autonomy, administrative
owers and responsibilities defined by a single Federal Constitution, thus having autonomy over revenues and expendi-
ures constitutionally defined. However, before the subnational governments achieved greater administrative and fiscal
utonomy, the Brazilian federation went through a long period of centralisation of power and resources within the
ederal government, which began during the military regime in 1964 and lasted until the end of the 1980s.
During this period, through the 1966 Tax Reform, two value-added taxes (VAT) were created with competences
anaged by distinct government levels and levied on the same base of consumption (Sampaio, 2004): the IPI (tax on
ndustrialised products), which is a competence of the federal government; and the ICM (tax on movement of goods),
hich is a competence of the states. These taxes, which are of a non-cumulative nature, came to replace the old taxes
hat were levied “in cascade” (cumulatively) on consumption.
Initially, the ICM was a uniform tax rate that did not interfere with resource allocation, making tax competition
ifficult among the states, and at that time, the federal government had restricted the ability of the states to legislate
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over this tax. Regarding the IPI, the federal government assigned a different tax rate structure in accordance with the
nature of the goods, levying higher tax rates on goods considered less essential.2
In the late 1980s, with the beginning of the re-democratisation, the Brazilian federation started to trigger a process of
political and fiscal decentralisation, having its peak with the 1988 Federal Constitution. Under the tax reform promoted
by the new constitution in 1988, taxes on electricity, fuel, communication services and interstate transportation were
incorporated into the base of the old ICM, which became known as a tax on operations for moving goods and services
and was rendered on interstate transportation, intermunicipal transportation and communication (ICMS).
The new constitution granted to states exclusive taxing powers and autonomy to manage, legislate, raise and spend
the revenues from this new tax. Thus, each state could set its internal ICMS rates, defined by ICMS regulations
appropriate to each of the Brazilian states and the Federal District, provided that such did not exceed the interstate tax
rates. Being able to set their tax rates according to their fiscal goals, states were then stimulated to engage a sort of
“war” for tax bases.
On the other hand, because it is also a VAT, in many situations, the ICMS occupies the same tax base as the IPI,
namely consumption. This suggests a possible competition for the same tax capacity between two different levels
of government. The most common cases of co-occupation of these taxes on the same tax base are those concerning
cigarettes and liquor. High federal and state tax rates are levied on the production and commercialisation of those
goods. One can also cite the case of the automobile industry, which is taxed by both mentioned taxes.
2.2.  Theoretical  analysis  of  ﬁscal  interdependence  among  levels  of  government:  effects  of  a vertical  tax  externality
The starting point in analysing the effects of a vertical tax externality within a federation considers the reactions of
subnational governments to a change in the federal government’s tax rate, when government levels share the same tax
base. In this sense, the theoretical analysis of the matter distinguishes four possible factors that can affect the direction
of this reaction: expenditure effect, complementarity or substitutability of taxes effect, revenue effect and deadweight
loss effect. The first two effects mentioned were analysed by Boadway and Keen (1996), considering the consequences
of a federal tax on state taxes, both levied on labour income. In a comparative statics exercise, the authors found
ambiguous signs for these two effects. Besley and Rosen (1998) developed a model that involves the four effects and
applied it to a commodities tax in the United States.
The expenditure effect represents the reaction of one government level to tax rate increases from another government
level, which adjusts its spending levels in response to a revenue decrease when both share that same base. In this sense,
when the federal government increases its tax rate, a subnational government may react by reducing its expenditure,
thus lowering its tax rate. Therefore, the expenditure effect has a negative sign. The complementarity or substitutability
effect occurs when a change in one tax rate affects the fiscal revenues of taxes levied on other tax bases. This effect can
lead to very complex and ambiguous responses from different government levels, and its sign is usually uncertain.3
Increases in tax rates by one government level affect the amount of revenue collected by the other government level
when these two levels share the same base. Thus, as noted by Besley and Rosen (1998), the revenue effect represents
the reaction of subnational governments to maintain their tax revenues, when the federal government increases its tax
rates. An increase in federal tax rates leads to a decrease in the tax revenues of subnational governments that, in turn,
react by raising their rates due to erosion in the tax base shared by both government levels in order to maintain their
tax revenues. The effect of this reaction is therefore positive.
The deadweight loss effect arises from the fact that the marginal disutility of tax on a particular good increases
with its tax rate. According to Besley and Rosen (1998), when states consider only the effect of increasing their tax
burden on their citizens – ignoring the excess tax burden created by the federal government – an increase in the federal
excise rate requires an increase in the state tributes, so that the indirect utility function of the consumer is maximised.
On the other hand, if the states adjust their tax rates to minimise the excess of a total tax burden, given the federal
2 In addition to the creation of these two taxes, the 1966–67 Tax Reform also created the ISS (Tax on Services of Any Nature), which is a
competence of the municipalities and replaced the old Tax on Industries and Professions, as well as the IOF (Tax on Financial Transactions), which
is a competence of the federal government.
3 In the model analysed by Boadway and Keen (1996), this effect is present in the situation where revenues on government incomes are affected
by changes in the tax on labour income.
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ax, an increase in the federal tax rate can lead to a decrease in state revenues, so that the indirect utility function of a
epresentative consumer is maximised. This signal is also ambiguous in the analysis.
In summary, from the analysis of the four effects mentioned above, it is considered that the reaction of subnational
overnments in relation to changes in federal tax rates is theoretically ambiguous. Therefore, an empirical analysis is
eeded to determine the direction and magnitude of the response from subnational government levels to tax changes
t the federal level.
In the theoretical model of tax competition developed by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) and modified by Karkalakos
nd Kotsogiannis (2007), the federal government overlaps sub-national governments and, by assumption, the policy-
akers involved are considered benevolent4 in the sense that they act in the best interest of their own individual
urisdictions. It is also considered an equalisation system.5 Their model consists of a federation with N ≥  1 states
ndexed by i = 1, .  . ., N, where for each state i, there is a firm that produces according to the production function Fi(Ki),
ith F ′i (Ki) >  0 and F ′′i (Ki) <  0, where Ki is the capital invested in state i. Capital is freely mobile among the states
f the federation and produces a single return, ρ, once taxed. It is assumed that capital is taxed by both federal and
tate governments. The state charges a unit tax ti, whereas the federal government charges a unit tax T, which is equal
or all states. Thus, capital is taxed by τi =  ti +  T  . Capital mobility implies that the return on capital after tax in state
 is F ′i (Ki) −  τi =  ρ. This condition implicitly defines the demand for capital in state i by Ki(ρ  +  τi), where:
K′i(ρ  +  τi) =
1
F ′′i (Ki)
< 0 (2.1)
Capital is paid by its marginal product; hence, the income generated by capital in state i  is expressed as the difference
etween the value of production and the cost of capital:
Πi(Ki) =  Fi(Ki) −  F ′i (Ki)Ki (2.2)
From (2.1) and (2.2), we have:
Π ′i(ρ  +  τi) =  −Ki(ρ  +  τi) <  0 (2.3)
Considering that a population of Mi citizens resides in each state i, a typical citizen j located in state i has preferences
efined over two periods of private consumption, Cji1 and C
j
i2, over the level gi of public goods provided by state i and
ver the level G  of public goods provided by the federal government. The utility function of consumer j of state i  is
epresented by uji (Cji1,  Cji2, gi,  G), where it is assumed that without loss of generality, uji (·) is strictly increasing and
oncave in all of its parameters. Each resident j of state i  has a fixed endowment eji of income in the first period and
n the second period, receives principal and interest on his/her savings plus per  capita  income produced after taxes in
is/her jurisdiction, defined by:
Π
j
i (ρ  +  τi) =
Πi(ρ  +  τi)
Mi
(2.4)
From the utility maximisation problem, aggregate savings of state i, Sji (ρ), such that S′(·) ≥  0, and the indirect
tility function, Vji (ρ,  τi,  gi,  G), are derived. Denoting aggregate savings in state i  by Si(ρ) =
∑Mi
i=1S
j
i (ρ), the net
eturn ρ(τ)6 is implicitly defined by the market equilibrium condition∑Ni=1Si(ρ) =∑Ni=1Ki(ρ  +  τi). Thus, it follows
hat:∂ρ
∂τi
= K
′
i(ρ  +  τi)∑N
l=1S′l(ρ) −
∑N
l=1K′l(ρ  +  τi)
∈  (−1,  0) (2.5)
4 In the literature on tax competition, some authors consider that policymakers are benevolent in the sense that they act in order to maximise the
elfare of their residents (Boadway and Keen, 1996; Boadway et al., 1998; Keen, 1998; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002, 2004). On the other hand,
he theory also admits that policymakers behave like leviathans, where the goal of their policies is to maximise tax revenues (Flowers, 1988; Keen,
998; Wrede, 1996; Flochel and Madies, 2002; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2003).
5 One can consider, for the Brazilian federation, that the variable in the model described as equalisation entitlements is transfers from the federal
overnment to the state and/or municipal governments. As an example, one can cite the Participation Fund of the States and the Federal District and
he Participation Fund of the Municipalities. These issues will be discussed in the empirical part of this work.
6 τ is defined as the N-vector of consolidated rates such that τ ≡ (τ1, . . .,  τN ).
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From (2.1) and the equilibrium condition defined above, the following expressions are obtained:
∂Ki
∂τi
=  K′i
(
1 + ∂ρ
∂τi
)
< 0,  i =  1,  . .  ., N.  (2.6)
∂Kl
∂τi
=  K′l
∂ρ
∂τi
>  0,  i /=  l,  i =  1,  . .  ., N. (2.7)
These expressions have an important meaning for the analysis. From (2.6), one can conclude that a tax increase on
capital in state i  reduces the capital in state i. Moreover, from (2.7), a tax increase from state i increases the capital in
state l.
The expenditures of the states are given by tax revenues plus equalisation entitlements. In relation to the model by
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), in the case of the Brazilian federation presented here, it is considered an equalisation
system that can be exemplified as the system of intergovernmental transfers between the federal government and states.
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) consider that the federal government equally allocates revenues among the states and that
there are no intergovernmental transfers vertically, among levels of government, or horizontally, among governments
of the same level.
The equalisation system is defined as follows: a base for the revenue source is chosen so that it represents, as closely
as possible, the real base of the revenue source. The total revenue of all states is then divided by the national base,
resulting in an average proportion of state revenue in relation to the federation. This proportion is then applied to the
base in a particular state, and the resulting tax is divided by the state population to obtain the per  capita  income tax
in relation to the average national proportion. The difference between per  capita  state income and per  capita  national
income, multiplied by the state’s population, represents the equalisation due to the state in relation to this revenue
source.
Applying this equalisation structure to the capital tax of state i, the per  capita  equalisation payment received by state i
is given by ωi = t˜(˜k −  ki), where the proportion of national revenue state average (t˜), national per  capita  income (˜k) and
per capita  tax base of state i (ki) are given, respectively, by t˜ =  (
∑N
i=1tiKi)/
∑N
i=1Ki), ˜k =
∑N
i=1Ki/
∑N
i=1Mi, ki =
Ki/Mi.
Assuming the existence of equalisation entitlements, the budget constraints on the states and federal government
may be represented by the following expressions:
gi =  tiKi +  Miωi (2.8)
G = T
∑N
l=1Kl −
∑N
l=1Mlωl
N
(2.9)
The government of state i, on choosing its tax rate, takes as given the tax rates of other states and the federation
to maximise the aggregate welfare in such state, denoted by Wi(ρ,  τi, gi, G,  ξi) =
∑Mi
i=1V
j
i (ρ,  τi,  gi,  G,  ξi), subject to
constraints (2.8) and (2.9), where vector ξi represents the vector of characteristics common to all states. Considering
this behaviour by state governments and using the expressions defined in (2.1), (2.3) and (2.5), the necessary condition
is obtained for states to maximise the welfare of its citizens, which can be implicitly represented by:
∂Wi(ti,  τ,  T,  ξi)
∂ti
≡  ψi(t1,  . .  ., ti, . . ., tN,  ω(t),  T,  ξi) =  0,  i =  1,  .  . ., N  (2.10)
where vector ω(t) denotes the dependence of the states on the rights of equalisation in vector t  =  (t1,  . .  ., ti,  . .  ., tN ).
A detailed analysis of expression Wt(ρ,  τi,  gi, G,  ξi) may conclude that states, when adjusting their tax ti, give rise to
vertical and horizontal externalities. When states increase their taxes, they ignore the benefit incurred to other states
by shifting their mobile tax base out of their domains and thus generating horizontal externalities. This effect can be
illustrated by the expression defined in (2.7). The vertical externality is derived from the fact that states ignore the
damage incurred to other states, leading to a contraction in the federal tax base, as can be observed in Eq. (2.9).7 These
interactions become more involved with the existence of equalisation rights.
7 The analysis of the theoretical model developed by Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) considers that the federal government behaves as a
Stackelberg leader with respect to the states of the federation in adjusting its rates. Thus, the states increase their rates in response to an arbitrary
increase by the federal government and ignore the contraction of the common tax base resulting from this fiscal adjustment.
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From expression (2.10), one can implicitly define a best response function of the state i  as:
ti =  fi(t1,  . .  ., t−i, ti,  .  . ., tN,  T,  ξi),  i  =  1,  . .  ., N.  (2.11)
The simultaneous solutions of Eq. (2.11) for all states determine the level of Nash equilibrium tax rates of the states
s a function of the federal tax T  and the vector of characteristics common to all states, ξ =  (ξ1,  . .  ., ξM). The main
bjective of this study is to estimate the slope of the reaction functions fi(·) with respect to federal tax T, considering
he horizontal interactions (i.e., tax competition of state i  with the other j  states of the federation), for j  /=  i and the
ector ξi.
.  Empirical  methodology
.1.  Speciﬁcation  of  the  econometric  model
The main objective of this study is to estimate a reaction function that characterises the fiscal policy behaviour of
tates by setting their taxes in relation to changes in federal taxes. The estimation of this fiscal reaction function will
ollow Eq. (2.11). Assuming that the fiscal reaction function of states is linear, the following equation will be estimated:
tst =  αst +  t−stβ  +  Tstγ  +  Xstδ  +  dtϕ  +  εst (3.1)
The dependent variable tst represents the effective tax rate of state s in year t; t−st is the weighted tax rate of other
tates as competitors of state s  in year t; Tst represents the effective federal tax rate8 at time t; Xst represents the
ocio-economic characteristics of each state s  at time t; dt represents a set of binary time variables (dummies); and εit
s the random error term of the regression.
The coefficient αst represents the fixed effect term. This term typifies the specific characteristics of each state.
he coefficients of interest in the analysis are β  and γ , which represent, respectively, the horizontal and vertical
nteractions in the model. Empirical evidence of horizontal tax interactions is represented in the model by a positive
nd statistically significant β. A vertical tax interaction is represented by a statistically significant γ , where the negative
ign of γ indicates that federal and state taxes are strategic substitutes. On the other hand, a positive sign of γ  indicates
hat federal and state taxes are most likely strategic complements.
.2.  Data  description
To empirically investigate vertical and horizontal interactions between government levels in the federation, the
conometric model described in (3.1) will be used. The dependent variable of the model is a measure that represents
n effective tax rate for each of the states in the analysis, calculated as the ratio between the ICMS tax revenue and the
DP in each state.
Regarding the federal tax rate, which enters into the model as an independent variable, it will also be used as an
ffective tax rate, represented by the ratio between IPI federal tax revenues collected in each of the Brazilian states
nd the respective GDP of these states. In all other empirical studies that address vertical tax competition, the federal
ax rate is simply the same for all cross-section units of the panel, varying only with time. Such methodology for
omputing the federal tax rates does not allow the inclusion of a set of time dummies  in the econometric model that
apture possible aggregate shocks that may occur each year, generating different effects on their tax rates. In this work,
he federal tax rates were built through the IPI tax revenue collected by a state, divided by the respective GDP of each
tate. Therefore, it is possible to find an effective tax rate for the federal tax specific to each state, allowing the use of
ime dummies  in the econometric model.The measures for tax rates used in this study may also represent a type of tax burden of those taxes (state or federal)
or each state. Several other studies calculate tax rates in this manner, such as Goodspeed (2000), Esteller-Moré and
olé-Ollé (2001) and Hayashi and Boadway (2001).
8 The subscript s indicates the federal rate referring to the state where the federal tax revenue was collected. It will be subsequently explained how
ach rate (state and federal) was computed.
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The variable used to measure horizontal interactions in the model was constructed by multiplying an exogenous
weight matrix by the vector of states’ tax rates, so that this constructed variable indicates the relevance of other
governments in the process of interaction. In the literature, these weights are generally related to Euclidean distance
(Anselin, 1988) or socio-economic characteristics (Case et al., 1993) among the states. In the econometric model
described above, this variable is represented by:
t−st =
∑
i /=  s
Wsitit (3.2)
where Wsi represents the exogenous weighting matrix, normalised such that the sum over the elements of each row
equals one (i.e.,∑s /=  iWsi =  1). Following this approach, two different weighting schemes were used in this research.
The first weighting scheme (Matrix W1) uses a matrix whose elements are based on the criterion of contiguity between
states, where it is assumed that the interaction occurs only between states that share the same geographic boundaries,
defining weight 1 for states that have borders in common and weight 0 otherwise. The second criterion (Matrix W2)
uses the inverse of the road distance between the capitals of states.9 This weighting scheme gives more weight to states
closer to the geographical boundaries of a given state, whereas states farther away receive less weight on their tax
rates. In both matrices, the standardisation of lines was considered, where the sum over the elements in the rows of the
matrix equals 1, according to the following formula:
Wsi=
wsi∑N
i=1wsi
(3.3)
where wsi is the ith element of row s of matrix Wsi.
The fiscal policy decisions of the states can be affected by characteristics of an economic or demographic nature. To
control such characteristics in the model, a set of exogenous variables was included to characterise the economic and
demographic situation of each state, represented by the variable Xst: resident population (POP); unemployment rate
(TAXDESEMP); number of people employed (POPOCUP); household income per  capita  (RENDPC); total expenditure
of the states in per  capita  terms (DESPTOTPC); the Theil index (ITHEIL); and the poverty rate (POBRE). Fiscal policies
taken by the federal government that are not related to the adjustment of federal taxes also affect states’ decisions in
setting tax rates. To control this phenomenon, it will be added the amount of current transfers from the federation to
the states, in per  capita  terms (TRCORRPC).
The population size (POP) was included in the model to capture the demand for public goods and services. According
to Leprince et al. (2007), more populous states have economies of scale in providing public services, and for this reason,
such states’ tax rates tend to be lower. Therefore, it is expected that the sign of the coefficient for this variable will
be negative. The variable total expenditure per  capita  (DESPTOTPC) was also included in the model to capture the
demand for public goods. Positive changes in government spending should be associated with higher levels of taxation
in the states; thus, it is expected that the sign of the estimated coefficient for this variable will be positive.
Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) argue that rich populations (i.e., with higher income per  capita) will demand
more public goods from the state and will therefore tolerate higher tax rates on their income. However, the effect of an
income increase in the tax rate of the state is uncertain because with higher income, a higher level of revenue can be
sustained with a lower tax rate. Therefore, there is no expected sign (i.e., positive or negative) in relation to the variable
income per  capita  (RENDPC). This variable also captures the possible effects of economic cycles, as well as the
unemployment rate (DESEMP) and employed population (POPOCUP). Thus, these variables control the exogenous
shocks that alter both state and federal tax rates, capturing possible co-movements between the effective tax rates.
As the unemployment rate is negatively correlated with the level of economic activity, it is expected that the
coefficient for this variable will be negative, in the sense that higher state revenue of ICMS is positively correlated with
economic activity. On the other hand, it is expected that the coefficient for the variable employed population will be
positive by the same factors related to unemployment.The poverty rate (POBRE) and the Theil index (ITHEIL) were used to control the social and income inequalities
among Brazilian states that may affect taxation policies in adjusting state taxes. There are no theoretical predictions for
these two variables, and the analysis of their coefficients is performed after estimating the suggested empirical models.
9 For the state of Amapá, the aerial distance was considered as its capital has no road links with other capitals of the country.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis.
Variable Description of variable Obs. Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Taxicms Measure of the tax rate of ICMS from
the states. It is represented by the ICMS
revenue divided by the GDP of the states.
405 0.0726 0.0162 0.0311 0.1237
Taxipi Measure of the IPI tax rate. It is
represented by the IPI revenue collected
in each state divided by the respective
GDP of the state where this revenue was
generated.
405 0.0086 0.0081 0.0004 0.0722
Pop Resident population of the states. 405 6,446,296 7,703,930 254,499 41,400,000
Desemp Percentage of people who sought but did
not find remunerated professional
occupation among all those considered
“active” on the labour market; group that
includes all persons 10 years old or older
who were working or looking for
employment in the reference week of the
National Household Sample Survey
(Pnad).
405 9.0312 2.7617 2.7099 20.537
Popocup Number of people who were working in
the reference week of the National
Household Sample Survey (Pnad/IBGE),
estimated from the microdata of the
survey.
405 2,770,064 3,505,528 67,049 20,106,470
Rendpc Average income of the population. 405 504.3676 210.4311 223.5479 1468.051
Desptotpc Total expenditures per capita. 405 2134.188 1055.313 664.7784 7996.581
Itheil Measures the degree of inequality in the
distribution of per capita household
income among individuals. It is the
logarithm of the ratio between the
arithmetic and geometric averages of
individual incomes, being null when no
income inequality exists between
individuals and tending to infinity when
income inequality tends to the maximum.
405 0.6594 0.1163 0.3388 1.0531
Pobre Percentage of people in the total
population with per capita household
income below the poverty line.
405 37.2856 16.7635 6.3574 72.5071
Trcorrpc Current transfers per capita. 405 862.6239 859.9439 160.8479 5142.264
Eletind Industrial electric energy consumption of
the states.
405 5161.205 9218.119 7.624 54,033
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tource: Own elaboration.
The amount of current transfers per  capita  (TRCORRPC) is also included. High levels of transfers increase the
tates’ revenues, allowing lower average state tax rates. Thus, this variable shall present the estimated coefficient with
 negative sign.
The consumption of industrial electric power (ELETIND) was used as a proxy  for the federal tax rate in tests carried
ut for exogeneity of the federal tax rate, which will be explained in the next section. Table 1 includes the main
escriptive statistics of the variables mentioned above. The data obtained are of annual frequency, and the period of
nalysis covers the years 1995–2009 and includes the 26 states plus the Federal District (i.e., 27 cross-section units in
he panel data), totalling 405 observations. All financial series were deflated by the IGP-DI.Lastly, all analysed models included a binary time variable (dummy) to capture the effects that may have occurred
n each year over the analysis in question. This strategy is not possible in studies that employ federal tax rates that
emain constant for each cross-section of the panel. In this work, the federal tax rate that is used varies both in the
emporal dimension and in cross-sections of the panel, allowing the inclusion of these variables.
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3.3.  Empirical  strategy  and  methodology  of  analysis
In addition to the treatment for fixed effects,10 another problem found in the estimation of Eq. (3.1) is the endogeneity
of competing states’ weighted tax rates in the model. According to Brueckner (2003), either by tax competition, welfare
competition or spillover effects,11 changes in fiscal policy in a particular state may affect decisions regarding the setting
and adjustment of tax rates in other states within the federation, indicating a dependence on fiscal policy among the
states. Therefore, it is expected that the tax rate of competing states is endogenous and correlated with the regression
error term (εst). A least squares estimation of Eq. (3.1) will produce biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameter
that measures the horizontal interactions in the model due to the existence of common shocks in the decision of fiscal
policy among the states. To address these problems, the approach of two-stage fixed effects will be employed where,
in the first stage, the reduced form of the endogenous variables of the model are estimated, and in the second stage, the
adjusted values are replaced in the original regression.12
In the first-stage regression, the exogenous variables of the model multiplied by the weighting matrices (∑i /=  sWsi ×
Xit) were used as instruments for the weighted tax rates of competing states, as suggested by Kelejian and Robinson
(1993) according to the criteria used in each of the matrices. The adjusted values have been computed and used as
instruments in the second stage-regression.
In the adjustment of the tax rates on the simultaneous game, the federal and state taxes can move simultaneously
within the federation due to some common factor. Exogenous shocks in the regression errors not controlled by the
model regressors may change both the state tax rates as well as the federal tax rate. In this context, the federal tax rate
may be endogenous in the econometric model. Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) argue that although it is difficult
for the federal government to react separately to each state in the federation and considering the federal tax rate to
be exogenous within the model, there may still be some correlation between this variable and the error term due to
common shocks in both tax rates. For this reason, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman exogeneity test (DWH) was employed to
check whether there is any correlation between the residuals of the regression and the federal tax variable. The results
of the DWH  tests pointed to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the federal tax rate. Thus, it was
decided that this should be considered an exogenous variable in the econometric model, instrumentalising only the
weighted tax rate of competing states.
However, the presence of heteroskedasticity among the cross-section of panel units and serial correlation in the
regression residuals create additional problems usually encountered when using panel data. To detect the presence of
heteroskedasticity, the modified Wald test for panel data was used, where the null hypothesis for this test is homoscedas-
ticity between the error terms of the panel. In all models, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was rejected. To
test whether the regression errors are serially correlated, the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data was
employed. The null hypothesis of this test is that there is no first-order serial correlation in the error terms of the panel.
Panel data with serially correlated errors can produce inefficient estimates of the parameters. In all models, the null
hypothesis that the errors are not serially correlated has been rejected.
To address these problems, in addition to fixed effects and two-stage approaches, the method of feasible generalised
least squares (FGLS) was used, which considers the possibility of heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation
in the error terms of the panel.
Following the empirical strategy mentioned above, two models were estimated. In the first model, it was assumed,
a priori, that states and the federal government act simultaneously and together in the federation when adjusting their
tax rates – as in a Cournot–Nash game – ignoring the vertical externality they impose on the other level of government.
Considering this assumption means that the effect of adjusting state tax rates in relation to changes in the federal tax
occurs the same year in which these changes take effect.
10 Hausman specification tests previously conducted in this study favoured the use of this method.
11 In tax competition models, the tax rate decision influences the migration of capital; in welfare competition models, the decision on the amount
of benefits given to the poor encourages the migration of this population. Therefore, in these models, competition between different units of the
federation aims to attract capital, labour and/or votes. In models with spillover effects, the optimum level of a decision variable affects the level of
such variables at other federal units because these effects may have an influence in a greater area than that of a single jurisdiction. For instance, a
state’s population can benefit from investment in hospitals, roads, and similar infrastructure carried out by a neighbouring state.
12 Kelejian and Prucha (1998) demonstrate that this method is also consistent with the presence of spatial correlation in the residuals.
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On the other hand, as seen before, the theoretical literature also considers that the federal government can act as a
tackelberg leader within the federation, by setting its tax rates first, and after observing this behaviour, states in the
ederation simultaneously and together set their tax rates. In this case, the states will react late to changes in federal
ax rates. To account for this possibility, the previous model was re-estimated, replacing the contemporaneous values
f the federal tax rate with their lagged values to represent the delayed reaction of the states in relation to adjustments
n the federal government’s tax rate. Mello (2007) adopts a similar approach by including the lagged rate of a given
tate in the reaction function in his study of horizontal tax competition among the Brazilian states.
After estimating the two models, considering the above specified assumptions about the behaviour of government
evels in setting their tax rates, the J  test approach proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) was considered to
elect the most plausible model for the data and Brazilian reality. The estimation results and model selection test are
resented in the next section.
.  Results
.1.  Results  for  the  federal  tax  rate  in  level:  the  Cournot–Nash  Model
The first model assumes that states and the federal government act simultaneously in setting their tax rates. In all
stimates, for both weighting matrices of competing states’ tax rates, evidence for the presence of heteroskedasticity
nd serial correlation was found in the estimated models. The estimation results considering the presence of horizontal
nteractions in the model are shown in Table 2.
The estimates of interest in the analysis are the coefficients of the federal tax and the weighted tax rate of the states.
he coefficient of the variable federal tax has presented, for both specified matrices, statistically significant and positive
stimates in all models considered, giving empirical evidence that state and federal taxes (i.e., ICMS and IPI) are most
ikely strategic complements. This result suggests that, on average, the Brazilian states tend to increase their ICMS
ffective tax rates in response to increases in the IPI effective tax rates observed in their territories and practiced by the
ederal government during the analysed periods. Therefore, when the federal government and states set their tax rates
imultaneously and together, the result may be an over-taxation of the tax base at high state and federal tax rates. This
esult can be explained by the revenue effect, mentioned in the previous sections.
The coefficient that measures the horizontal interaction in the model is statistically significant and positive for both
eighting schemes used. This result can be interpreted as the reaction of states to changes in other states’ fiscal policies.
n average, a state will reduce its effective ICMS tax rate in response to a reduction in this tax rate observed in other
razilian states. As observed in Table 2, it is found that when the weighting matrix considers only the border states
Matrix W1), then the reaction on the tax rates seems to be lower in magnitude than considering the inverse distance
atrix (Matrix W2), which considers the influence of all federation states on a given state’s fiscal policy. This result
uggests that when a state sets its tax rate considering the fiscal reaction of all other states involved in the federation,
hen the magnitude of the reaction will be greater than if considering only the states contiguous to it.
Regarding the other variables in the model, the coefficient of the unemployment rate was statistically insignificant in
ll estimations presented in Table 2. The coefficient of the employed population in the model is positive and significant
n the regression that utilise Matrix W2 as weighting scheme. This sign is in accordance with expectations, as explained
n Section 3.2. Total expenditures per  capita  were positive and statistically significant in all estimations. This result
uggests that high levels of spending are associated with a higher level of taxation, indicating that higher levels of
pending will demand a higher budget constraint, which is achieved through higher tax rates.
The estimates for the coefficient of the Theil index were positive and statistically significant in all regressions. The
ositive sign for this variable suggests that, on average, the higher the level of income inequality in a state, the higher
s the effective ICMS tax rate in this state. This is consistent with the prediction of theoretical models for the median
oter, where a strong positive correlation is expected between income inequality and tax burden in a federation.
The negative sign was expected for the population variable coefficient, which proved to be significant from the
tatistical point of view for the results that used the weighted Matrix W2. This may reflect, as already explained, the
dea that states with larger populations has economies of scale in the provision of public goods to its population. The
egative sign for the coefficient of the variable income per  capita  suggests that states with higher income per  capita
o not need high tax rates to maintain a balanced budget because higher income levels allow greater revenues, even
ith the application of a lower effective tax rate.
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Table 2
2FGLS estimates for the states’ reaction function with the exogenous federal tax rate at level.
Weighting matrices
Matrix W1 Matrix W2
Dependent variable: ICMS effective tax rate of state i (taxicms)
Federal tax rate (taxipi) 0.5215*** 0.5938***
(0.08932) (0.0935)
Weighted tax rate of states j (taxicmsj) 0.1828*** 0.5157***
(0.0589) (0.0939)
Population × 10−6 (pop) −0.0014 −0.0018**
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Unemployment rate (desemp) 0.0007 −0.0063
(0.0212) (0.0213)
Number of people employed × 10−6 (popocup) 0.0029 0.0042**
(0.002) (0.0018)
Household income per capita × 10−3 (lnrendpc) −0.0683*** −0.0587***
(0.0067) (0.0067)
Total expenditure per capita × 10−3 (desptotpc) 0.0027*** 0.0022**
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Theil inequality index (itheil) 0.0274*** 0.0261***
(0.0051) (0.005)
Poverty rate (pobre) −0.0653*** −0.0642***
(0.0096) (0.0091)
Current transfers per capita × 10−3 (trcorrpc) −0.0052*** −0.0062***
(0.0014) (0.0013)
Constant 0.0909*** 0.0643***
(0.0069) (0.0086)
Annual dummies Yes Yes
Wald test statistic χ2 (25) 313.67 300.63
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Source: Own elaboration.
Observations: (1) Standard errors in parentheses are robust for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation; (2) Matrix W1: contiguity matrix among all
states; Matrix W2: matrix of the inverse of road distances among states.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.The poverty rate has presented negative and statistically significant coefficients in all estimations considered. This
result suggests that, on average, the higher the poverty rate, the lower is the effective ICMS tax rate within the states
when the poverty rate rises. This result, together with the observed sign of the variable intergovernmental transfers,
may reflect the greater dependence of the poorest Brazilian states on revenue transfers. Thus, on average, within poorer
states with lower average income and with a higher proportion of transferred revenue in relation to total revenues, the
ratio of ICMS to GDP is lower, explaining the negative correlation between these variables and the effective ICMS
tax rate. As explained previously, the negative sign of transfers can also be related to a lower fiscal effort of state
governments in raising tax revenue because the revenue transferred to the states has a direct positive impact on their
budgets, reducing the pressure for states to increase their effective ICMS tax rates.
To verify the robustness of these results, the contemporary competition model was estimated again through instru-
mental variables (IV) in the context of the generalised method of moments (IV-2SLS-GMM), following Politi and
Mattos (2012). In the first stage, the endogenous variable, t−st =
∑
i /=  sWsitit , is regressed on the exogenous variables
and on the instrumental variables and the significant regressors are used in an estimation with instrumental variables
from Eq. (3.1) without the time dummies in the second stage. The selected instrumental variables for the regression that
utilise weighting scheme W1 were population, household income per  capita, Theil inequality index, current transfers
per capita, and the third lag of ICMS tax rate weighted by Matrix W1. For the second weighting scheme W2, the
selected instrumental variables were population, unemployment rate, household income per capita, total expenditure
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Table 3
2FGLS estimates for the states’ reaction function with the lagged exogenous federal tax rate.
Weighting matrices
Matrix W1 Matrix W2
Dependent variable: ICMS tax rate of state i (taxicms)
Federal tax rate in t − 1 (taxipit−1) 0.3141*** 0.3963***
(0.1082) (0.1127)
Weighted tax rate of states j (taxicmsj) 0.1703*** 0.5254***
(0.0622) (0.0976)
Population × 10−6 (pop) −0.0011 −0.0016*
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Unemployment rate (desemp) −0.0008 −0.0083
(0.0226) (0.0225)
Number of people employed × 10−6 (popocup) 0.0022 0.0037*
(0.0022) (0.0021)
Household income per capita × 10−3 (lnrendpc) −0.0719*** −0.0622***
(0.007) (0.007)
Total expenditure per capita × 10−3 (desptotpc) 0.0035*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Theil inequality index (itheil) 0.0287*** 0.02781***
(0.0055) (0.0054)
Poverty rate (pobre) −0.0678*** −0.0676***
(0.0101) (0.0096)
Current transfers per capita × 10−3 (trcorrpc) −0.0058*** −0.0071***
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Constant 0.0938*** 0.0663***
(0.0074) (0.0090)
Annual dummies Yes Yes
Wald test statistic χ2 (25) 262.12 259.23
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Source: Own elaboration.
Observations: (1) Standard errors in parentheses are robust for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation; (2) Matrix W1: contiguity matrix among all
states; Matrix W2: matrix of the inverse of road distances among states.
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er capita, Theil inequality index, poverty rate, current transfers per capita, and second lag of ICMS tax rate weighted
y Matrix W2.
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 1A in Appendix in which the reported standard deviations are robust
o heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The estimated parameters of the horizontal and vertical interaction remain
ositive and statistically significant. The variables population, number of people employed, and current transfers per
apita were not statistically significant in this estimation procedure, whereas the variable current transfers per capita
s significant in the previous one, by 2FGLS. It is worth noting that the standard deviations of the coefficients that
easure vertical and horizontal interactions are lower in the first estimation procedure (2FGLS) than those obtained
ith the latter (IV-2SLS-GMM). Despite these differences, both estimation procedures present empirical evidence of
 significant horizontal and vertical interaction among states and between these and the federal government.
.2.  Results  for  the  lagged  federal  tax  rate:  Stackelberg  Model
It is assumed in this specification that the federal government behaves as a Stackelberg leader, setting its tax rates
rst, and states behave as followers in the federation. In the empirical strategy of this assumption, the federal tax rate
s considered to be exogenous and lagged one period in the econometric model, to represent the movements of states’
scal policy after observing the tax policy decision of the federal government. The states, in turn, are assumed to behave
s Nash competitors in relation to one another in the federation, in a second stage of competition, after observing the
scal policy decisions from the federal government. Estimation results are shown in Table 3.
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Table 4
Coefficient estimates of the predicted values for the Stackelberg Model as an explanatory variable in the Cournot–Nash Model.
Davidson–MacKinnon J test
Null hypothesis: Cournot–Nash Model
Matrix W1 Matrix W2
Estimates t Prob. > t Estimates t Prob. > t
−0.1585 −0.47 0.64 −0.0411 −0.14 0.886
(0.3386) (0.2876)
Obs.: (1) Values in parentheses represent standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation; (2) the null hypothesis of the test is that
the Cournot–Nash Model is correctly specified against the alternative hypothesis that the Stackelberg Model is the one correctly specified.
As one can see, the results in Table 3 are similar to those in Table 2. However, the magnitude of the reaction in this
model is lower than in the previous case. This result corroborates the theoretical analysis developed by Boadway et al.
(1998) and Keen (1998) about the federal government’s position within the federation. The authors suggest that the
federal government can eliminate some effects of vertical tax externality in the federation, behaving as a Stackelberg
leader in setting its tax rates through appropriate fiscal policies. In this sense, the analysis of this result suggests that
when states react with a delay to changes in the federal tax rate – with the federal government behaving as a Stackelberg
type leader in setting its tax rates – the intensity of the vertical externality is lower than if these two governments acted
simultaneously in setting their tax rates.
Regarding the estimates for the coefficient that measures the horizontal interaction in the model, the result is also
similar to the case discussed in the previous section and all estimates for this coefficient are positive and statistically
significant. The magnitude of the direction of states’ reaction is also lower compared to the previous case. The
interpretations of this analysis are analogous to the Nash case, as well as for other control variables of the model, which
did not show significantly different results from the analysis conducted in the previous case.
4.3.  Test  of  model  selection:  Cournot–Nash  assumption  ×  Stackelberg  assumption
The estimations of the two previous sections naturally bring about the question of which of the two models is the
most appropriate to describe the vertical tax competition in Brazil. After all, both models estimated in Sections 4.1 and
4.2 are consistent with theoretical predictions. To determine how the setting of the state tax rates occurs, in relation
to changes in federal tax rates, the J  test methodology proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) was employed.
First, the estimated values for the Stackelberg Model were computed, adding these values as an additional regressor
in the Cournot–Nash Model. Then, this new regression was estimated, with the predicted values from the Stackelberg
Model, and the significance of the estimated parameter for this variable was verified with the usual t test. The estimated
parameters for this variable and their t-statistics are presented in Table 4.
The coefficients of the predicted values for the Stackelberg Model as an explanatory variable in the Nash Model are
statistically insignificant in both weighting matrices employed. According to the J test procedure, these results point
to the non-rejection of the Cournot–Nash Model. Following the procedure of the Davidson and MacKinnon J test, the
roles of the hypotheses are reversed, i.e., the roles of the Cournot–Nash and Stackelberg models. The estimated values
of the ICMS tax rate for the Nash Model are computed as a regressor in the Stackelberg Model, repeating the same
methodology of the previous procedure. The results are shown in Table 5.
In both weighting matrices employed, the coefficients’ significance tests of the predicted values for the Nash–Cournot
Model as a regressor in the Stackelberg Model were statistically significant. This result suggests no rejection of the
Cournot–Nash Model, to the detriment of the Stackelberg Model.Therefore, the J  test methodology suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) leads to the conclusion that the
Cournot–Nash Model is the one that best explains the average behaviour of states in setting their tax rates with other
states and with the federal government. This result suggests that when the federal government adjusts its tax rates, the
states’ response to this change occurs during the same year in which such change is made, with both government levels
adjusting their tax rates simultaneously and together, as in a Cournot–Nash strategic game.
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Table 5
Coefficient estimates of the predicted values for the Cournot–Nash Model as an explanatory variable in the Stackelberg Model.
Davidson–MacKinnon J test
Null hypothesis: Stackelberg Model
Matrix W1 Matrix W2
Estimates t Prob. > t Estimates t Prob. > t
1.3035 5.24 0.0000 1.2743 5.49 0.0000
(0.2485) (0.2319)
Obs.: (1) Values in parentheses represent standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation; (2) the null hypothesis of the test is that
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whe Stackelberg Model is correctly specified against the alternative hypothesis that the Cournot–Nash Model is the one correctly specified.
.  Conclusions
The main objective of this work was to estimate an average reaction function for the Brazilian states that expresses
he effect of changes in federal tax rates on states’ tax policy. The theoretical models, in general, suggest that states
espond by changing their tax rates when the federal government changes its taxes over a tax base common to both
overnment levels, demonstrating an inter-relationship between their tax policies. Given this possibility and considering
hat horizontal tax competition among states has an important role in setting state excise rates, two models were estimated
ith different specifications for the federal tax rate, whose parameter measures the strength and direction of the states’
djustment in relation to changes in the federal tax rates.
The first model estimated considers that states and the federal government set their taxes simultaneously and together
n the federation, as in a Cournot–Nash strategic game. To represent this assumption in the specification of the empirical
odel, contemporary values of the federal tax rate were considered as a regressor in the states’ reaction function. The
esults found in this model point to a positive and statistically significant reaction of the states in response to increases
n federal government tax rates. That is, states increase their ICMS tax rates in response to increases in federal IPI tax
ates.
The second model assumes that the federal government can behave as a Stackelberg leader in setting its tax rates
ithin the federation. In the specification of the empirical model, the values of the federal tax rate lagged one period were
sed as a regressor in the states’ reaction function to represent this assumption. Analogously to the previous case and
gain introducing horizontal tax competition as a relevant variable in the model, in all estimated regressions, a positive
nd statistically significant sign was found for this variable’s coefficient, which measures the vertical interactions in
he model.
However, when comparing the magnitude of the reactions, the absolute values found for this coefficient are smaller
han the absolute values found in the previous model, where the government levels involved adjust their tax rates as
n a Cournot–Nash strategic game. Regarding the variable that captures the effects of horizontal interaction among
tates, in both models considered, a positive and statistically significant relation was found for this variable’s estimated
oefficient when employing matrices W1 (contiguity) and W2 (Inverse Road Distance) as weights for the tax rates of
ompeting states. This result suggests that geographically close states increase or decrease their ICMS tax rates in the
ame direction as other competing states. Considering the intensity of the effect of horizontal tax competition among
tates, it was also observed that the values obtained for the coefficient that measures the intensity and direction of this
ompetition are larger in absolute value when the inverse road distance among the states is considered in relation to the
ontiguity criteria. It seems that states respond with greater intensity when they observe tax policy movements among
ll of the states involved than when they observe only the tax policies of bordering states.
Although many of the empirical studies consider that states and the federal government behave as in a Cournot–Nash
trategic game in setting their tax rates, the theory admits that the federal government may also behave as a Stackelberg
eader within the federation. Through the J  test methodology proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), the
ssumption that states and the federal government behave as Nash competitors appears to be most consistent with the
ata considered in this analysis.
Therefore, the results found in this study point to the existence of vertical tax competition, in average terms, in
hich federal and state governments adjust simultaneously and together their tax rates, as in a Cournot–Nash game.
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The result of this competition is generally over-taxation, at tax rates higher than optimal, of a given common base. This
over-taxation can be explained in part by the revenue effect previously explained in this work, where the states respond
by elevating their effective tax rates in response to an increase in federal tax rates, due to erosion of their bases and
consequent losses of tax revenue. The results also suggest that tax policy movements of other states in the federation
are an important variable in the adjustment of state taxes, suggesting the presence of horizontal tax competition among
geographically close states.
Appendix.
Table 1A
IV-2SLS-GMM estimates for the states’ reaction function with the exogenous federal tax rate at level – Cournot–Nash Model.
Weighting matrices
Matrix W1 Matrix W2
Dependent variable: ICMS effective tax rate of state i (taxicms)
Federal tax rate (taxipi) 0.5823* 0.4137***
(0.3242) (0.1549)
Weighted tax rate of states j (taxicmsj) 1.0544*** 1.5787***
(0.3727) (0.2981)
Population × 10−6 (pop) −0.0007 0.0013
(0.003) (0.0026)
Unemployment rate (desemp) −0.0382 −0.1117***
(0.0354) (0.0305)
Number of people employed × 10−6 (popocup) −0.00008 −0.00016
(0.0036) (0.0032)
Household income per capita × 10−3 (lnrendpc) −0.0382** −0.0287**
(0.016) (0.0149)
Total expenditure per capita × 10−3 (desptotpc) 0.0017 0.0041**
(0.0035) (0.0019)
Theil inequality index (itheil) 0.01901* 0.0159
(0.0104) (0.0107)
Poverty rate (pobre) −0.0571*** −0.0187
(0.019) (0.0189)
Current transfers per capita × 10−3 (trcorrpc) −0.0026 −0.0033
(0.0043) (0.0023)
Annual dummies No No
Sargan–Hansen J statistic 4.081 7.192
Chi-sq(8) p-value 0.3952 0.4092
Source: Own elaboration.
Observations: (1) Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation; (2) Matrix W1: contiguity matrix among
all states; Matrix W2: matrix of the inverse of road distances among states; (3) Endogenous variable: weighted tax rate of states; (4) Instrumental
variables used: exogenous variables weighted by matrices W1 and W2 (population, unemployment rate, number of people employed, household
income per capita, total expenditure per capita, Theil inequality index, poverty rate, current transfers per capita), the third lag of icms tax rate for
Matrix W1,and the second lag of icms tax rate for Matrix W2.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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